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Abstract—Recent developments in blockchains and edge com-
puting allows to deploy decentralized shared economy with utility
tokens, where altcoins secure and reward useful work. However,
the majority of the systems being developed, does not provide
mechanisms to pair workers and clients, or rely on manual
and insecure resolution. AStERISK bridges this gap allowing
to perform sealed-bid auctions on blockchains, automatically
determine the most optimal price for services, and assign clients
to the most suitable workers. AStERISK allows workers to specify
a minimal price for their work, and hide submitted bids as well
the identity of the bidders without relying on any centralized
party at any point. We provide a smart contract implementation
of AStERISK and show how to deploy it within the Filecoin
network, and perform an initial benchmark on Chainspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing model developed during the last two
decades was built on the premise of compute centralization.
That is, computing power is geographically and administra-
tively concentrated in compute infrastructures of industrial
scale, generally called datacenters. As a result, the majority of
users currently rely on clouds for applications such as hosting
services, offloading computation, and data storage. However,
centralization introduces several drawbacks; cloud computing
services act as large central points of failure [1], and make
possible for authorities to enforce censorship [2] or violate user
privacy [3]. Furthermore, large cloud operators often abuse
their market position to effectively force users to trust their
service and adapt to operators’ rules and prices.
Recent research efforts focus on shared-economy infras-
tructures, where services are performed by users sharing their
resources with each other at the edge of the network [4].
Such infrastructures can provide better quality of service,
and reduce the exposure to central points of failures and
abuse of power; but require security solutions and reliable
incentive mechanisms to compensate the lack of trust between
distributed users. Following the recent success of Bitcoin [5]
a large amount of cryptocurrency projects implement such a
shared economy model and use blockchains to secure their
platforms and simplify payments [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
The vision is to create a decentralized system, where users are
incentivized to perform useful work and automatically receive
rewards upon tasks completion.
While multiple projects focus on the crucial task of proving
to the network that a service has been successfully completed
[12], [13], [14], [15], an equally important task of determining
an optimal price for those services has been largely ignored by
the community. Furthermore, industrial projects either do not
cover this problem or rely on manual user interaction causing
multiple scalability and security issues [6], [7], [8], [9]. In this
work, we answer to the question of how blockchains and smart
contracts can be leveraged for deriving the price of a service in
distributed computing infrastructures and automatically assign
service requesters to corresponding workers.
Clearly, the providers of the distributed infrastructure are
expected to ask for compensation, since admitting user requests
will impose operational expenses while occupying their per-
sonal computing as well as storage resources. Therefore, the
sufficient participation of infrastructure providers is associated
with an incentivisation mechanism that allows them to profit
by offering their resources at a price that equals or exceeds,
their expenses. That is, the objectives of users and providers
are conflicting with each other since the former try to access
a service at the lowest possible price while the latter try to
maximise their revenue. Therefore, there is a need for a market
mechanism that will intervene, in the form of an auction,
to ensure the effective association between user requests to
providers’ resources. By running auctions on blockchain, user
do not have trust each other nor any trusted 3rd party, they
inherit security guarantees from the underlying distributed
ledger and can be sure that auction is performed correctly
using Smart Contracts. However, data submitted to blockchain
automatically becomes public and in sealed-bid auctions it
is critical to hide all the bids during the auction. Moreover,
revealing bidders identity imposes another security threat; i.e.,
revealing that a bidder bought storage space at two servers
makes the servers an easy target for malicious users willing
the bidder to lose their data.
In this paper we propose AStERISK— an auction-based
shared economy resolution system running on top of dis-
tributed ledger. In AStERISK, workers submit their offers
to the blockchain together with a minimal price they are
willing to accept. Our system hides submitted bids and protects
bidders identity using anonymous credentials. In contrast to
related work, AStERISK does not rely on a single trusted
3rd party to issue all the credentials, but rather on a set of
multiple, decentralised authorities. Each user can define their
own set trusted parties and is protected from a subset of
authorities becoming malicious. Once an auction is finished,
AStERISK automatically creates a binding on the blockchain
allowing workers to claim money from requester deposits upon
submission of a valid proof of useful work. For simplicity,
we focus on the case of Filecoin [16], a decentralized storage
network, but AStERISK can be easily adapted to work with
additional systems implementing a shared economy model.
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II. BACKGROUND
a) Blockchain: The blockchain technology [5] imple-
ments a distributed, append-only ledger in the form of con-
nected blocks; once information is stored in the blockchain it
cannot be removed or altered. Network participants use a con-
sensus protocol to agree on the current state of the ledger, and
the system maintains its properties as long as a subset of the
participants is honest. Blockchains are used to record crypto-
currencies (e.g.,, Bitcoin [5], Ethereum [17]) transactions. A
common extension consisting of scripting languages enables to
include logic as part of the transaction and allows deployment
of smart contracts—code submitted to the blockchain and
executed by all network participants. AStERISK leverages the
high-integrity data structure provided by blockchains, and uses
it for accountancy, auditability, and time reference (e.g., time
may be define as the block height of the main chain).
b) Filecoin: At the core of Filecoin lies a Storage
Market that allows requesters to pay miners, to store data.
Specifically, a Storage Market acts as an exchange point
where clients and miners can advertise their requests and
offer resources. The Network guarantees that the miners are
rewarded by the clients when providing the service. Filecoin
uses Proof-of-Replication [15] a scheme that relies on zero-
knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowl-
edge (zk-SNARKs) [18], [19] allowing a Prover to prove
possession of data D. To prevent Sybil attacks and allow
proving possession of multiple copies of the same file, Proofs-
of-Replication are generated over a version of data encrypted
under a key ek specified by the requester such that RDek =
Encode(D, ek). Filecoin requires the Prover to recursively and
continuously generate those proofs with randomness r obtained
from the most recent block in the blockchain and thus proving
possession of the file over time.
c) Anonymous Credentials: Anonymous
credentials [20], [21] allow the issuance of credentials
to users, and the subsequent unlinkable revelation to a verifier.
Users can selectively disclose some of the attributes embedded
in the credential or specific functions of these attributes. Most
anonymous credentials scheme entrust a single authority
with a master credential signature key, allowing a malicious
authority to forge any credential. Other schemes do not
provide the necessary re-randomization or blind issuing
properties necessary to implement general purpose disclosure
credentials. To overcome these limitations, AStERISK
relies on Coconut [22] which supports distributed threshold
issuance of credentials; therefore supporting private attributes,
re-randomization, and unlinkable multi-show selective
disclosure without relying on a central trusted 3rd party.
Coconut is designed for use in the context of blockchains
to ensure confidentiality, authenticity and availability even
when a subset of credential issuing authorities are malicious
or offline; and uses short and computationally efficient
credentials that can easily be verified by a smart contract.
Colluding authorities can forge Coconut credentials, but
cannot break unlinkability and de-anonymize users. Coconut
authorities issue credentials without communicating with each
other, following a standard key distribution phase; as a result,
a large number of authorities may be used to issue credentials
without significantly affecting efficiency.
III. DESIGN GOALS
AStERISK associates worker resources to users via the
execution of an auction mechanism. Specifically, we consider
a system with the following actors:
• Bidders - users willing to access a services (e.g., Filecoin
users wishing to store some data in the network).
• Workers - offer their services to the users (e.g., Filecoin
miners wishing to store users file for specific prices).
• Authorities - distributed system responsible to issue
credentials allowing users to participate in auctions.
AStERISK assumes that at least a threshold subset of the
authorities are honest; all cryptographic operations rely (or are
implied by) the XDH assumption [23]; and relies on weak
synchrony1 for liveness (but not for safety). These assumptions
are inherited from Coconut, and the underlying smart contract
platform. Given this threat model, AStERISK achieves the
following design goals:
• Hidden Minimum Price: Workers can specify a mini-
mum price for which they are willing to perform given
actions, and are guaranteed that the winner of the auction
bids at least that price. This minimum price is kept private
from the bidders until the end of the auction.
• Bidders Privacy: Bidders are unlinkable to to their bids.
Only the identity of the winner is revealed to the worker
(at the end of the auction).
• Bids Privacy: Bids are kept private until the end of the
auction; bidders submit their bids without knowledge of
what other bidders do.
• Bids Binding: Bidders cannot change their bids once they
are committed.
• Public Auditability: Anyone can verify the correct exe-
cution of any auction.
• Fairness: Bidders are financially penalized if they deviate
from the protocol, but cannot be financially penalized
if they follow it correctly. Bidders cannot double-spend
coins [27], and no authority can steal bidder’s funds.
• Non-Interactivity: Bidders are not required to interact
with each other.
• Censorship Resistance: Anyone can act as bidder or
worker; the system is resilient to censorship.
• Distributed Authority: AStERISK never relies on a
single trusted 3rd party.
• Auction’s economic properties: Involving i) Efficiency,
in terms of assigning resources to the bidders that value
them the most in a computationally feasible way, ii)
Incentive Compatibility (Truthfulness), where bidders and
workers benefit by revealing their true valuations, iii)
Individual Rationality, where both bidders and workers
are willing to participate, and iv) Budget Balance, where
the payments submitted cover workers’ compensations.
IV. ASTERISK DESIGN
A. AStERISK Smart Contract
We design AStERISK as a smart contract that extends
the tumbler application of Coconut [22] to allow credentials
to be used as anonymous bids in auctions2. The AStERISK
1Weak synchrony [24] is required by many smart contract platforms [25],
[26], and by distributed key generation protocols required by Coconut [22].
2The tumbler application is described at Section V.A of Coconut [22].
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(a) Preparation phase. (b) Auction phase. (c) Execution phase.
Fig. 1: Overview of auction executions on AStERISK
smart contract defines six functions (Setup, Create, Deposit,
Commit, Reveal, Withdraw):
v Setup: A set of authorities jointly create an instance of
the AStERISK contract by providing their public keys as
well as any other scheme parameters as the number of
authorities and the threshold parameter. This function can
be run multiple time, and by different sets of authorities;
the workers then select the set of authorities they trust upon
executing Create.
v Create: Any 3rd party worker creates an auction by
specifying the set of authorities trusted to issue credentials,
as well as any application specific parameter or policy. They
also specify, a commitment to the minimum price for which
they are willing to operate; and two time-tamps3, tcommit
and treveal (where tcommit < treveal) used during the
auction phase (see Section IV-B).
v Deposit: Bidders deposit v coins into a buffer account
specified by the smart contract to request a credential on
the public attribute v, and on a private randomly generated
sequence number s. To prevent tracing traffic analysis,
v should be limited to a specific set of possible values,
similar to cash denominations. Each authority monitors the
AStERISK smart contract, and issue a partial credential to
the user—either on chain or off-chain—upon detecting a
credential request (credential requests are processed only if
bidders paid a deposit of v coins to the smart contract).
bidders locally aggregate all partial credentials into a con-
solidated credential.
v Commit: Bidders submit a bid by showing a valid cre-
dential to the smart contract; they also provides a proof
of knowledge of the sequence number s along with a
group element ζ uniquely built from s. If the proof and
the credential check, the smart contract records ζ. The
group element ζ embeds the sequence number s and is
therefore bound to the credential and the number of coins v
it embeds—showing ζ effectively commits to v. The smart
contract accepts the bidders input only before tcommit.
v Reveal: Bidders reveal v, ζ, and the credentials, as well
as a proof that v is correctly embedded in the credentials
and asserting correctness of ζ. The smart contract accepts
the bidders input only after tcommit and before treveal, and
if the smart contract previously recorded ζ (i.e., if the bidder
committed to its bid). Workers open the commitment to the
minimum price they committed to during Create.
3Time may be defined as the number of blocks built on top of the main
chain of the blockchain.
v Withdraw: To withdraw the coins, the bidder provides
the smart contract with a zk-proof of knowledge of their
private key by binding the proof to the address addr
where they wish to redeem the coins; they also provides
the consolidated credential, ζ, and a zk-proof attesting its
correctness. To prevent double spending, the contract keeps
a record of all group elements ζ that have already been
shown. Upon showing a ζ embedding a fresh (unspent)
sequence number s, the contract verifies the credential and
zero-knowledge proofs, and that ζ doesn’t already appear in
the spent list. Then, it withdraws v coins from the buffer and
sends them to the specified address addr, and adds ζ to the
spent list. Bidders can only withdraw coins after treveal,
and only credentials that have been recorded by Commit
and Reveal can be used to withdraw coins (this effectively
lock the funds of bidders that deviate from the protocol).
According to the policy set upon executing Create, the
winner of the auction may be treated differently.
v SubmitWork: After treveal, the winner contacts the
worker through a private channel, and uploads cryptographic
material to the smart contract allowing the worker to retrieve
its payment. Winners can anonymously prove they actually
won the auction by proving possession of the consolidated
credential, ζ, and a zk-proof attesting its correctness. In the
case of Filecoin, the winner proves they won the auction to
the smart contract, and uploads a hash of the encrypted file
to store along with a signature. The file hash is then used
to verify Proofs of Spacetime [15] submitted by the worker
and release payments from the bidder’s deposit over time.
B. The AStERISK Protocol
Figure 1 shows the execution of an auction on AStERISK;
the auction is divided in three phases:
• Preparation phase (Figure 1a): Bidders pay deposits and
retrieve a credential required to participate in auctions,
and storage nodes submit their offers.
• Auction phase (Figure 1b): Bidders commit and later
reveal their bids. The smart contracts determines the
winner by applying a Vickrey auction mechanism [28].
• Execution phase (Figure 1c): Auction winner contacts
its corresponding storage nodes, prove their identity and
submit files to store. Storage node receives rewards for
storing files over time.
a) Preparation phase: A set of authorities executes the
Setup function of the AStERISK smart contract described in
Section IV-A. Any worker executes Create (Figure 1a-Ì) to
create an auction by specifying the auction parameters, and
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which set of authorities they trust. They also specify the two
time-tamps, tcommit and treveal determining the auction’s time
line; workers advertise their product and provide a commitment
to a minimum price v0 at which they are willing to operate.
Bidders execute Deposit by paying a deposits of v coins into
a buffer account specified by the AStERISK smart contract
(Figure 1a-Ê), and retrieve a credential required to participate
in auctions (Figure 1a-Ë). The value v represents the number
of coins they wish to bid.
b) Auction phase: Bidders execute Commit (Figure 1b-
Ê) to commit to a bid for a particular auction on the smart
contract. Bidders commitments are only considered valid if
submitted before the deadline tcommit. Next, workers open
the commitment to their minimum price, and bidders call
Reveal (Figure 1b-Ë) to open their commitment to the smart
contract; bidders openings are valid only if submitted before
the deadline treveal. Finally (Figure 1b-Ì), the winner of
the auction is deduced from the execution trace of the smart
contract. The group element ζ associated with the highest v
(if v ≥ v0) indicates the winner of the auction—all bidders
that correctly followed the protocol (except the winner) may
withdraw their coins calling the Withdraw function of the
AStERISK contract. If there is no winner, the auction fails and
every bidder may withdraw their money. AStERISK applies a
Vickrey auction mechanism [28]; the winner of the auction
is the bidder with the highest bid v, and pays the price of
the second highest bid, v′. That is, the winner is free to call
Withdraw to withdraw (v − v′) coins.
c) Execution phase: The winning bidder execute Sub-
mitWork (Figure 1c-Í) and submits hashes of the encrypted
files to store. They then contact the corresponding worker off-
chain, prove they are the rightful winner by showing their
credential, and directly transmits the file replica RDek to the
worker. The worker can then start generating proofs of useful
work, submit them to the blockchain, and claim rewards from
the winner’s deposit. Verifying the proof of useful work and
releasing the payment is an integral part of the underlying
blockchain, and is out of the scope of this work.
V. DISCUSSION
AStERISK involves worker specific contracts that offer
resources in the form of a single item. In practice more
sophisticated auctions are of interest where multiple workers
offer their resources in the form of multiple items while bidders
express their bids for a subset of them on the same contract;
such ambition comes at the challenges of (i) auction execution,
and (ii) bidding privacy and security.
With respect to the auction execution, it has been shown
that combinatorial auction can be modelled as the set packing
problem, meaning that they are NP-hard and there is no
polynomial-time algorithm for finding the optimal allocation.
A solution would be to consider a system where bidders are
associated into up to a single item. That would lead to a
computationally feasible and efficient assignment, i.e., multi-
item unit demand auction [29] setting, on the expense however
of bidders’ flexibility in expressing their preferences. On the
other hand, the bidders are expected to submit a vector of
bids, i.e., one bid for each offered item. Although the Deposit
function can be easily scaled up, i.e., by putting as a deposit
the sum of bids or the maximum bid in a vector, the analysis
of such vectors of bids could reveal information on the bidder
andcreate a privacy challenge that has to be addressed.
VI. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
We argue how AStERISK achieves the design goals de-
scribed in Section III.
a) Hidden Minimum Price: Upon the execution phase
of the auction, AStERISK guarantees that a worker will offer
their resources at a price higher than the minimum price or
not offer their resources at all.
b) Bidders privacy: AStERISK takes advantage of Co-
conut’s unlinkability property to break the link between the
deposit of coins, the commit of bids, and the withdraw of
the coins. As a result, bidders can submit bids on auctions
without revealing their identity, yet proving possession of a
valid credential.
c) Bids privacy: Bids are kept private until tcommit; the
zero-knowledge property of Coconut credentials implies that
no information about v is revealed while committing to a bid
(Figure 1b-Ê).
d) Bids binding: Bidders are bound to their bids as they
are first required to commit to their bid (Figure 1b-Ê), and
then to open the commitment (Figure 1b-Ë). Bidders cannot
open the commitment to another value than the previously
committed as this implies forging the Coconut credentials.
e) Public auditability: AStERISK is implemented as a
smart contract; its correct execution can be verified by any
3rd party by taking advantage of the public auditability of the
underlying smart contract plateform.
f) Fairness: No single authority can create credentials
and steal all the coins in the buffer account of the smart
contract—the threshold property of Coconut implies that ad-
versaries need to corrupt an arbitrarily large set of authorities
for this attack to be possible. Bidders cannot participate to
the auction phase (Figure 1b) without paying a deposit to
receive a valid credential; setting tcommit < treveal forces the
bidders to commit to their bid before revealing it, preventing
any 3rd party from seeing other bidder’s bid before committing
to a value. Bidders dropping out after committing a bid (and
never revealing it) are financially penalized as they cannot
withdraw their coins. Coconut provides blind issuance which
allows bidders to obtain a credential on the sequence number
s without the authorities learning its value. Without blindness,
any authority seeing s could potentially race the bidders,
and withdraw the coins of the credential—blindness prevents
authorities from stealing the coins. Keeping a spent list of
all group elements ζ prevents double-spending attacks [27]
without revealing the sequence number s; this prevents an
attacker from exploiting a race condition upon withdrawing
and which may lock bidders coins.
g) Non-interactivity: Bidders do not interact with each
other. During the preparation phase (Figure 1a), Bidders only
interact with a subset of the the authorities to receive a
credential; during the auction phase (Figure 1b), they only
interact with the smart contract; during the execution phase
(Figure 1c), bidders only interact with the workers or with the
smart contract to withdraw their coins.
h) Censorship resistance: The decentralized nature of
the underlying smart contract platform makes the AStERISK
smart contract resilient to censorship. Furthermore, a small
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AStERISK Chainspace smart contract
Operation µ [ms]
√
σ2 [ms] size [kB]
Create [g] 28.433 ± 0.214 ∼ 1.8
Create [c] 0.0148 ± 0.002 -
Commit [g] 194.243 ± 0.410 ∼ 2.7
Commit [c] 355.852 ± 15.880 -
Reveal [g] 205.656 ± 5.659 ∼ 2.7
Reveal [c] 351.192 ± 8.514 -
Withdraw [g] 188.925 ± 2.084 ∼ 2.6
Withdraw [c] 336.533 ± 4.490 -
SubmitWork [g] 197.399 ± 6.537 ∼ 2.7
SubmitWork [c] 368.948 ± 13.116 -
TABLE I: Timing and transaction size of the AStERISK Chainspace smart
contract (described in Section IV-A), measured over 10,000 runs. The trans-
actions are independent of the number of authorities. The notation [g] denotes
the execution the procedure and [c] denotes the execution of the checker.
The Deposit function is not implemented as it is identical to the tumbler
application described in Coconut [22].
subset of authorities cannot block the issuance credentials—
the service is guaranteed to be available as long as at least a
threshold number of authorities are running.
i) Distributed authority: AStERISK introduce no sin-
gle trusted 3rd party; the AStERISK contract is executed on
a decentralized smart contract platform, and Coconut allows
threshold issuance of credentials.
j) Auction’s economic properties: An auction satisfies
all those properties only under the condition of price-taker
participants [30], i.e., both bidders and workers have no impact
on the auction prices. In the single item auctions we consider
here, it has been proven that Vickrey auctions possesses all
these desired attributes based on the assumption of “sealed
bids”, where neither bidders nor workers have information
about the state of the auction [28]. AStERISK through its
privacy properties provides a technical implementation of the
“sealed bids” assumption which prevents price manipulations.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
We provide an open-source implementation4 of the
AStERISK smart contract presented in Section IV-A for
Chainspace [25]. Our implementation does not enforce con-
ditions on timers tcommit and treveal as Chainspace currently
does not provide functions to check block heights. We write
our prototype in about 450 lines of Python code using an
open source Python implementation of Coconut5, which reply
on petlib6 and pblib7; the bilinear pairing is defined over the
Barreto-Naehrig curve8, using OpenSSL as arithmetic backend.
Table I provides the timing and transaction size for each func-
tion of the smart contract; each experiment is the result of 100
runs measured on a commodity laptop (a MacBook Pro 13’ 2.7
GHz Intel Core i7, running macOS Mojave). As expected, both
the procedure and the checker of Create are extremely fast
as they don’t involve cryptographic operations. The checker
of Commit, Reveal, Withdraw, and SubmitWork take on
average the same (and the longest) time as their core operation
is to verify credentials validity; verifying credentials takes
the longest time due to pairing operations [22]. The Deposit
4https://github.com/asonnino/coconut-chainspace
5https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
6https://github.com/gdanezis/petlib
7https://github.com/gdanezis/bplib
8https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-kasamatsu-bncurves-01.html
function is not implemented as it is identical to the tumbler
application described in Coconut [22].
VIII. RELATED WORK
There are several frameworks that target hiding private data
submitted to a public ledger. Hawk [33] divides Smart Contract
into public and private parts and secure private input using
zero-knowledge proofs, but requires a centralized trusted man-
ager to operate. Furthermore, ShadowEth [31] allows process-
ing confidential Smart Contract data using Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE). However, such a scheme requires users to
trust the hardware vendor and can expose the system to TEE’s
vulnerabilities [37], [38]. On the subject of sealed-bid auctions,
Blass and Kerschbaum [34] proposed Strain, that preserve
bids privacy against malicious participants. Strain uses a two-
party comparison protocol, but has a flaw that reveals the
order of bids. Furthermore, running protocols involving MPC
on blockchain is not efficient due to extensive computations
and the number of rounds involved. Furthermore, Galal and
Youssef [39] presented a protocol that ensures public verifiabil-
ity, privacy of bids, and fairness. However, the solution scales
badly with the number of bidders and relies on random number
retrieved from blockchains that are not proven to be secure.
This scheme was improved in [35] using zk-SNARKS, but still
relies on a centralized party for zero-knowledge proofs and
does not protect bidders identity. An alternative approach was
proposed by Bogetoft et al. [36]. The system uses a multiparty
computation to perform auctions on encrypted bids. However,
such a scheme reveals final assignment between bidders and
object and lacks transparency. Currently, Filecoin [16] does not
implement an automated system assigning clients to storage
nodes. Users are required to chose storage nodes manually and
offers are publicly posted on the blockchain. Other industrial
system such Golem [6], iExec [8] or SONM [7] either do
not specify their requester—worker assignment technique rely
on similar, insecure solutions. All those platform could use
AStERISK to increase their level of security and automatically
determine optimal price for services. We summarize discussed
solutions and their security features in Table II.
IX. LIMITATIONS
AStERISK inherits several limitations of Coconut which
acts as the underlying credential scheme. These limitations are
beyond the scope of this work, and deferred to future work.
AStERISK is vulnerable if more than the threshold number
of authorities are malicious; colluding authorities could create
credentials to steal all the coins in the buffer of the smart
contract. Note that bidders ’ privacy is still guaranteed under
colluding authorities, or an eventual compromise of their keys.
The smart contract implementation of AStERISK described
in Section IV-A does not scale to a large number of users
as as each commitment and bid is kept on-chain. A potential
solution is to defer the auction logic to state channel [40],
and only seal the final result of the auction on the blockchain.
Moreover, AStERISK inherits from any scalability limitation
of the underlying smart contract platform.
The winner of the auction may invoke SubmitWork, but
refuse to transfer data to the worker. This prevents the worker
from claiming the reward and leave their resources unused
until the next auction. This issue is inherited from Filecoin
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System Bids Privacy Bidders Privacy Bidders Non-Interactivity Distributed Authority Trusted Hardware Public Auditability
ShadowEth [31] 3 7 3 Intel SGX [32] 3
Hawk [33] 3 7 3 None 3
Strain [34] 3 7 7 None 3
Galal et al. [35] 3 7 7 None 3
Bogetoft et al. [36] 3 7 3 None 7
Filecoin [16] 7 7 7 None 3
AStERISK 3 3 3 None 3
TABLE II: Comparison security properties achieved by different systems discussed in this section. The decentralization property reads as follows; : relies
on a trusted 3rd party, : relies on a trusted 3rd party for only one (or some) of the properties described in Section III, : does not rely on any trusted
3rd party.
and can be mitigated with additional mechanisms assuring fair
exchange of digital goods [41].
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented AStERISK— a system for determining op-
timal prices for services in a shared economy environment
and automatic assignments of requesters to the most optimal
workers. AStERISK allows to securely perform sealed-bid
auction on a blockchain using anonymous credentials and zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge. Our system allows workers to
specify a minimal price for their services, protects users bids
as well as the identity of the bidders. Contrary to the previous
work, AStERISK does not rely on a trusted 3rd party to issue
credentials, but rather on a set of entities that can be freely
chosen by users. The distributed authorities issue only partial
credentials that are merged locally by each users protecting
the system from a subset of malicious authorities. We showed
how AStERISK can be deployed in the Filecoin network
and adapted to other shared economy systems operating on
blockchain. As a part of future work, we plan to extend our
system to securely support requesters’ evaluation of multiple
items and protect against data analysis attacks. Furthermore,
we will investigate scalability of our solution with large
networks and better integration with additional platforms.
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